Objective. To determine the impact of Florida's Medicaid Demonstration 4 years post-implementation on per member per month (PMPM) Medicaid expenditures and whether receiving care through HMOs versus provider service networks (PSNs) in the Demonstration was associated with PMPM expenditures. Data. Florida Medicaid claims from two fiscal years prior to implementation of the Demonstration (FY0405, FY0506) and the first four fiscal years after implementation (FY0607-FY0910) from two urban Demonstration counties and two urban non-Demonstration counties. Study Design. A difference-in-difference approach was used to compare changes in enrollee expenditures before and after implementation of the Demonstration overall and specifically for HMOs and PSNs. Data Extraction. Claims data were extracted for enrollees in the Demonstration and non-Demonstration counties and collapsed into monthly amounts (N = 26,819,987 person-months). Principal Findings. Among SSI enrollees, the Demonstration resulted in lower increases in PMPM expenditures over time ($40) compared with the non-Demonstration counties ($186), with Demonstration PSNs lowering PMPM expenditures by $7 more than HMOs. Savings were also seen among TANF enrollees but to a lesser extent.
month administrative fee and pays PSN providers on a fee-for-service basis. If PSNs achieve cost savings in a particular time period, they receive additional payments (a portion of the savings). If PSNs do not achieve cost savings, they must return a portion of the administrative fees. Thus, PSNs are at risk for the administrative fees, not the total cost of care. This is similar in some ways to the Medicare Shared Savings ACO model in which ACOs share savings but are not at risk for losses (one-sided risk). Unlike ACOs, PSNs are not yet accountable for total cost of care and payments are not tied to quality performance. Like the ACO approach, however, the original PSN legislation called for PSNs to move to risk-adjusted capitation after a 3-year transition period (the same language is used for Pioneer ACOs). Subsequent Florida legislation allowed PSNs to remain fee-for-service. So far, no PSNs have moved to riskadjusted capitation and no payments are based on quality performance measures. The PSNs are all not-for-profit entities that operate only in Florida and only enroll Medicaid beneficiaries.
Their parent organizations are either safety-net hospitals or large physician group practices that predominately serve Medicaid patients. In summary, PSNs share some of the features of ACOs and the experience in Florida over the past several years is likely to be informative for the initial years of the Medicare ACO models being implemented nationally.
In addition to the PSNs, Florida Medicaid beneficiaries in the Demonstration counties can choose Medicaid HMOs, which are paid a risk-adjusted monthly premium to provide all care to enrollees. The experience in Florida Medicaid provides an opportunity to examine these different organizational models (HMO vs. PSN) .
Differences in organization structure, reimbursement approach, ownership, and populations served could result in differences in expenditures across the two plan types. In particular, the PSN model is similar to many emerging ACOs, in that providers (either safety-net hospital systems or physician networks) are the owners and drivers of these plans. In addition, the PSN financial approach includes discounted fee-for-service payments with shared savings potential. Finally, in these organizations, quality measures were required and publicly reported by plan name and county during the demonstration.
Across the rest of the state, Medicaid beneficiaries can also choose a Medicaid HMO or enroll in a primary care case management program (PCCM), called MediPass. Care for enrollees in MediPass is provided on a fee-for-service basis, with primary care providers serving as gatekeepers ( Johnson et al. 2010) . However, the gatekeeper function under MediPass is relatively minimal (compared with that in HMOs) as there are essentially no 860 HSR: Health Services Research 49:3 (June 2014) incentives for primary care providers to monitor referrals for specialty and other care. The HMOs in non-Demonstration counties are not paid riskadjusted premiums as they are in the Demonstration counties. So, in the nonDemonstration counties, MediPass and HMOs are not subject to the same reimbursement mechanisms as in the Demonstration counties and, consequently, may have higher expenditures. Table 1 includes a summary of the characteristics of Florida PSNs, Medicaid HMOs, and MediPass. A previous study examining Florida's Medicaid's Demonstration compared per member per month (PMPM) expenditures in the Demonstration counties with those in non-Demonstration counties 2 years after implementation and found no significant impact of the Demonstration on PMPM expenditures ), but it did not look at the effect of enrolling in a PSN versus an HMO in the Demonstration counties. In this study, we use a similar analytic approach to examine changes in PMPM expenditures 4 years after implementation for all Demonstration plans and specifically between PSNs and HMOs in the urban Demonstration counties and compare those changes in expenditures to those observed in two matched non-Demonstration counties.
METHODS

Analytic Approach
The analytic approach for this study was to compare changes in expenditures in the Demonstration counties to changes in expenditures in two comparable counties that were not participating in the Demonstration. This difference-indifference approach takes into account changes in Medicaid expenditures that may have been occurring regardless of the Demonstration. The expenditures examined only include direct payments for medical care or capitates premiums and do not include administrative costs incurred by Florida's Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA). Changes in expenditures between the baseline period, which is defined as the two fiscal years before the implementation of the Demonstration (FY0405 and FY0506), and the first 4 years of the Demonstration (FY0607 through FY0910) in the two urban Demonstration counties of Broward and Duval were measured and compared with changes in two other Florida urban counties, Hillsborough and Orange Counties (the "non-Demonstration counties") over the same time period. Duval County is in Northeast Florida and is the location of Jacksonville. Broward County includes urban communities north of Miami, such as Fort Lauderdale and Table 2 ). Hillsborough and Orange Counties do not have PSN market penetration. In the comparisons, MediPass enrollment is used as a proxy for PSN enrollment, as both are paid on an FFS basis. Enrollees in Duval did not have a PSN plan option until the Medicaid Demonstration was implemented in September 2006. For the 2 years before the Demonstration, the HMO market penetration rate for both the Demonstration and non-Demonstration counties was over 50 percent, with the non-Demonstration counties having a slightly higher HMO presence. Compared with the non-Demonstration counties, Demonstration counties had a slightly higher MediPass/PSN enrollment, partly due to the absence of PSNs in the non-Demonstration counties. In general, the proportion of HMO and PSN/MediPass enrollment for the Demonstration counties was similar to the two non-Demonstration counties for both years before the Demonstration program began.
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Data
To calculate baseline expenditures, all facility, medical, and pharmacy claims or analogous HMO capitation payment amounts were obtained for all The analysis used a person-month approach, meaning each observation corresponds to expenditures by a person in a month. Therefore, each individual could contribute up to 24 member months used in the baseline calculations (one for each month of the two fiscal years; mean = 6.4 months). Using this method, the final baseline cohort from Broward and Duval Counties included 5,152,099 member months, with 656,855 eligible through SSI (36 percent enrolled in HMO, 60 percent enrolled in PCCM, and 4 percent in FFS) and 4,495,244 eligible through TANF (50 percent enrolled in HMO, 48 percent enrolled in PCCM, and 2 percent in FFS). To calculate expenditures for the Demonstration period, all payments made to HMOs and PSNs for Demonstration enrollees who were enrolled for at least 1 month during the period between FY0607 and FY0910 (the first 4 years of the Demonstration) were included. For PSNs, PMPM expenditures were the sum of all paid amounts for claims in a given month, including a monthly patient case management fee paid to PSN providers, whereas for HMOs, the PMPM expenditures were simply the monthly risk-adjusted capitated premiums. Months where individuals were eligible for waiver and/or special services or which included retroactive eligibility were not included in the baseline or Demonstration calculations. As with the baseline data, each observation corresponds to expenditures for a person in a month, meaning each individual could contribute up to 46 member months (mean = 9.1 months) in the calculations (the Demonstration health plans did not begin enrolling individuals until September 1, 2006) . In the first year of the Demonstration, the Medicaid population in the Demonstration counties was transitioned over a period of several months into Demonstration health plans. The transition was completed in April 2007 . This resulted in a final reform cohort of 7,358,380 member months from FY0607 to FY0910 combined, with 913,633 eligible through SSI (59 percent enrolled in HMO and 41 percent in PSN) and 6,444,747 eligible through TANF (69 percent enrolled in HMO and 31 percent in PSN).
Overall time trends for the Medicaid expenditures were accounted for by including expenditures for enrollees in the selected non-Demonstration counties. The same selection criteria for enrollees and services used for the calculation of PMPM expenditures in the Demonstration counties were used to calculate PMPM expenditures for enrollees in the non-Demonstration counties. 
Statistical Analysis
First, unadjusted differences in average PMPM expenditures between the Demonstration period and the baseline period were calculated for PSN and HMO enrollees combined and separately for the Demonstration counties and the non-Demonstration counties, and then the difference in the difference (Demonstration counties' difference minus non-Demonstration counties' difference) was calculated. These differences were calculated separately for SSI and TANF enrollees and calculations were done on the full population and with the top 5 percent of observations removed to diminish the influence of outliers.
The subjects (cohorts) are a complete database of the eligible Medicaid enrollees germane to this analytic question, as distinct from a random sample. We examine the change in average expenditures for all eligible enrollees in the Demonstration and non-Demonstration counties, in the baseline and Demonstration period and not an individual's expenditure change over time. It was not practical to examine individual changes over time because of the high rate of turnover among Medicaid enrollees. Examining individual changes over time would greatly limit the cohort size and the ability to generalize the results. Next, a series of multivariate analyses were conducted to better understand the pattern of changes in expenditures after controlling for any differences in age, race, or gender between the non-Demonstration and Demonstration counties, as well as differences between HMO and PSN enrollees. The models also included the individual's risk score as a covariate, to control for differences in health status between enrollees in the Demonstration and non-Demonstration counties and between PSNs and HMOs in the Demonstration counties. These scores were calculated using the Medicaid Rx methodology, which measures health status using pharmacy claims (http:// medicaidrx.ucsd.edu/), and used by Florida's Medicaid program to risk-adjust capitation rates to HMOs, but were calculated for enrollees in the Demonstration and non-Demonstration counties during the Demonstration period. As with the univariate analysis, the multivariate analysis used a difference-indifference approach. These analyses examined whether the change in per member per month expenditures over time significantly differed between the Demonstration versus non-Demonstration counties with both combined and separate estimates for PSN versus HMO enrollment in the Demonstration counties. The data were highly skewed with long tails and a log transformation did not allow the data to approach normality. As a result, several different panel data models were estimated to determine which model achieved the best fit. The models estimated included both one-part and two-part models, generalized estimating equations (GEE) using a gamma family with a log link, a loglinear random effects regression, and linear regression using untransformed PMPM expenditures, but with the top 5 percent of observations removed to reduce skewness and kurtosis. Because expenditures were calculated on a PMPM basis, the unit of analysis is a person-month. Thus, an individual could provide up to 70 observations to the analyses. All models used the XT procedures of Stata 10.0 to account for correlation of observations over time (StataCorp 2007) . The one-part GEE model using the gamma family with a log link and random effects displayed adequate model fit and although this model does not have the same precision as a log-linear model in the presence of long tails, it produces consistent estimates and precision is not a serious issue given the extremely large cohort size used in the analysis (Manning and Mullahy 2001) .
Thus, the results presented focus on the one-part gamma regression models that included all observations (i.e., top 5 percent included).
The model that combined HMO and PSN enrollees includes a variable for time ("time" coded as months 1 through 70), a dummy variable for whether the observation was from the Demonstration period of FY0607-FY0910 (referred to as "post"), a dummy variable indicating whether the observation was from one of the counties that participated in the Demonstration (referred to as "reformcounty"), an interaction of time and post (time*post), an interaction of time and a dummy variable indicating enrollment in a Demonstration (time*reformcounty), a dummy variable indicating that the observation was from the postperiod and a Demonstration county (post*reformcounty), and an interaction of time, postperiod, and Demonstration enrollment (time*post*reformcounty). This model estimates separate slopes for baseline and Demonstration periods for both the Demonstration and non-Demonstration counties and specifically tests whether the differences in slopes to the baseline period and the postimplementation period of the Demonstration is different from those for the non-Demonstration counties (indicated by the coefficient for time*post*reformcounty). The model also indicates whether there was a shift in the intercept in the Demonstration counties once the Demonstration was implemented (indicated by the coefficients for post*reformcounty). The estimated equation is as follows:
where e it follows a gamma distribution and "exp" signifies the log link. Thus, b 6 indicates the difference in the intercept for the period after implementation of the Demonstration for observations from Demonstration counties and b 7 tests whether the change in the slope pre-and postimplementation of the Demonstration was significantly different for the Demonstration counties than for the observations from the non-Demonstration counties. This equation was estimated separately for enrollees in SSI and TANF.
To examine whether the impact of the demonstration on PMPM expenditures significantly differed for enrollees in Demonstration HMOs versus PSNs, a second model was estimated that was similar to the previous equation
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Thus, b 7 and b 8 indicate the difference in the intercept for the period after implementation of the Demonstration for observations from Demonstration PSNs and HMOs and b 9 and b 10 tests whether the change in the slope pre-and postimplementation of the Demonstration was significantly different for the Demonstration PSNs and HMOs than for the observations from the non-Demonstration counties.
Next, the estimated equation was used to predict PMPM expenditure in the pre-and postimplementation of Demonstration period for both non-Demonstration enrollees and for all enrollees in the Demonstration counties and then separately for enrollees in Demonstration PSNs and HMOs. The approach taken was to assume that everyone in the population (enrollees in non-Demonstration and Demonstration counties) was either in the Demonstration county or non-Demonstration county for the first model and in the Demonstration PSNs or HMOs or in the non-Demonstration counties in the second model and then predict expenditures for each of the time periods. This allows the demographics to be identical for the estimation cohorts and simulates what would have happened if everyone were either in a non-Demonstration plan or everyone was in a Demonstration PSN and/or HMO. The difference in predicted expenditures pre-and postimplementation is then calculated for Demonstration all together and for PSN and HMO groups and the non-Demonstration groups separately and then the difference of this difference is calculated between the Demonstration counties together and separately for PSNs and HMOs and in the non-Demonstration counties.
RESULTS
There were some differences in the demographics and health status between Medicaid enrollees in HMOs and PSNs in the Demonstration counties. For SSI enrollees in the Demonstration counties, 26.3 percent were African
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American in HMOs compared to 11.5 percent in PSNs, and 21.4 percent were classified as a race other than Caucasian or African American in HMOs compared to 8.8 percent in PSNs. SSI enrollees in HMOs were also slightly younger on average compared with PSNs (33.5 vs. 35.5) and had lower risk scores on average (0.32 vs. 0.77). The enrollees were similar in the proportion of Latino enrollees (2.6 percent vs. 2.1 percent) and in the proportion that were male (50.1 percent vs. 51.1 percent). For TANF enrollees in the Demonstration counties, 35.4 percent were African American in HMOs compared to 13.4 percent in PSNs, 10.8 percent of HMO enrollees were Latino compared to 3.9 percent of PSN enrollees, and 5.1 percent of HMO enrollees were classified as other race compared to 1.5 percent of PSN enrollees. TANF-HMO enrollees also had lower risk scores on average than PSN enrollees (0.20 vs. 0.44). TANF enrollees were similar in terms of age (10.9 vs. 10.3) and male gender (44.6 percent vs. 45.5 percent).
Before adjusting for differences in the enrollee populations between the Demonstration and non-Demonstration counties, it appears that average PMPM expenditures were better controlled in the Demonstration counties than the non-Demonstration counties, with the largest difference observed among PSN enrollees (see Table 3 ). The change in PMPM expenditures for SSI enrollees in the Demonstration counties was $263 less than the change in PMPM expenditures in the non-Demonstration counties. When looking at Demonstration HMO and PSN enrollees separately, the change in PMPM expenditures for SSI enrollees in HMOs in the Demonstration counties was $150 less than the change in PMPM expenditure for similar enrollees in HMOs in the non-Demonstration counties, whereas the change in PMPM expenditures for SSI enrollees in PSNs in the Demonstration counties was $279 less than the change in PMPM expenditures for similar MediPass enrollees in the non-Demonstration counties. The change in PMPM expenditures for all TANF enrollees in the Demonstration counties was $35 less than the change in the non-Demonstration counties. The change in PMPM expenditure for TANF enrollees in HMOs in the Demonstration counties was $31 less than the change for TANF-HMO enrollees in the non-Demonstration counties, whereas the change in PMPM expenditures for TANF-PSN enrollees in the Demonstration counties was $36 less than the change for TANF-MediPass enrollees in the non-Demonstration counties.
Relative reductions in expected expenditures remain after adjusting for demographic differences (p < .001 in all cases; see Figure 1 ), although the magnitude of the difference between the Demonstration and non-Demonstration counties is not as large as the unadjusted differences, with PMPM expenditures for SSI enrollees increasing by $40 in the Demonstration counties, but increasing by $186 in the non-Demonstration counties (see Figure 1) . Expenditures for enrollees in Demonstration HMOs increased by $40 and increased by $33 for enrollees in Demonstration PSNs (see Table 4 ). Thus, for SSI enrollees, PSNs appear to be reducing expenditures by $153 compared to the Table 5 ). For TANF enrollees, PSNs appear to be reducing expenditures by $32 compared to the non-Demonstration counties, whereas HMOs appear to be reducing expenditures by $29 compared to the non-Demonstration counties. The multivariate analysis showed that the Demonstration initially increased average PMPM expenditures for SSI enrollees, as shown by the positive coefficients for post*HMO and post*PSN (p < .001 in both cases), but that there was a downward trend in expenditures over time for both PSN and HMO enrollees, as shown by the negative coefficients for time*post*HOM and time*post*PSN (p < .001 in both cases) compared to the non-Demonstration counties, suggesting that the Demonstration was able to "bend the cost curve." Similar findings, but with smaller magnitudes, were observed for the TANF enrollees, although there was no shift in intercept for PSNs (p = .238), with downward trends observed over time for both PSNs and HMOs (p < .001 in both cases). An additional analysis was conducted that was limited to only those individuals with at least 3 or 6 months of Medicaid eligibility in both the preDemonstration period ( July 1, 2004 -June 30 2006 and Demonstration period (September 1, 2006 -July 1, 2010 . This was done to determine if the impact of the Demonstration was different among those individuals with more stable Medicaid enrollment. When limited to these individuals, it appears that the Demonstration counties controlled costs better than the nonDemonstration counties for both the SSI and TANF populations, although the cost reductions were smaller among SSI enrollees compare with the full cohort ($67 vs $205), and were larger for the TANF population ($54 vs $32). payments made by AHCA to PSNs, HMOs, and MediPass providers for management of Medicaid enrollees were included in the calculations. Also, the data do not include out-of-pocket payments by enrollees, so it is not possible to know if the Demonstration changed out-of-pocket cost burden in this population. An additional limitation is that this analysis did not measure changes in expenditures for individual enrollees, pre-and post-Demonstration implementation. The PMPM expenditure calculations during the pre-Demonstration period refer to enrollees during that time period, a different group of individuals than those who are the basis for calculating PMPM expenditures in the post-Demonstration period. In addition, because individuals selected into plans and were not randomized, there is the potential for selection bias. There were some observed differences in demographics and risk scores between HMOs and PSNs and the non-Demonstration counties, and case mix might have varied over these periods. Given that there were differences in observed variables, it is likely that there were also some differences in unobserved characteristics that were related to both choice of health plan and expenditures. However, given that the analyses were limited to individuals enrolled in Medicaid through SSI and TANF, the same exclusion criteria were applied in all time periods, the multivariate analyses controlled for demographics and risk scores, and a difference-in-difference approach is used, it is unlikely that case mix and other differences in unobserved factors are driving these results.
Although these limitations exist, this study demonstrates that 4 years into the Demonstration project in Florida's Medicaid program, reductions in expenditures are being achieved. The slightly greater reductions in expenditures among PSNs combined with better patient experiences among PSN enrollees relative to HMO enrollees found in an earlier study point to PSNs as a promising model for delivering care to Medicaid enrollees. Exactly why PSNs perform differently remains unclear at this point. Further research can uncover the extent to which the organizational structure, mission, and payment arrangements are directly or indirectly linked to lower expenditures. It will be important to continue to monitor the program to see if lower expenditures are maintained and also to determine how reductions in expenditures are being achieved.
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